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Abstract 
Using evidence from an original dataset of more than 12 million fares, this study sheds light 
on two issues relating to the pricing behaviour of the main European airlines: 1) the extent to which 
an airline’s dominant position at the origin airport, at the route and the city-pair level affects the 
airlines’ market power; 2) whether fares follow a monotonic time path consistent with the pursuing 
of an inter-temporal price discrimination strategy. Our estimates reveal that enjoying a dominant 
position within a route is conducive to higher fares, possibly because of the limited size of many 
“natural monopoly” routes that facilitate the incumbent’s engagement in a limit pricing strategy. On 
the contrary, a larger share within a city-pair does not seem to facilitate the exercise of market 
power, thereby suggesting the existence of a large degree of substitutability between the routes in a 
city-pair.  
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1. Introduction  
The European aviation sector has gone through dramatic changes in the last decade, due to 
alterations of the legal, institutional and cultural environment. The legal and institutional 
transformations have influenced the supply side of the industry whereas new cultural attitudes seem 
to have changed the way passengers travel. 
On the supply side, one cannot ignore the importance of the deregulation process 
implemented by the European Commission, which has transformed a highly regulated sector into a 
free-market industry.  
The objectives of the air transport liberalization were achieved through different policy 
packages. In 1987 the Council of Ministers of the European community agreed a more liberal 
airfares system, declared the end of the principle of the equal sharing of capacity on routes served 
by airlines of two different member states, and opened up the market access to new companies.1 In 
1990 a second “package” of liberalisation measures reinforced the lifting of constraints on pricing 
and capacity, and further eased market access by allowing the entry of several companies on routes 
with high traffic density. More importantly, the European airlines were provided with the freedom 
of operating on most European routes. A third package finally came into force in 1993, effectively 
creating an “open skies” regime for the EU air transportation market. All the intra-European routes 
were finally open to free entry, and companies were allowed to operate without capacity or price 
restrictions, even on routes outside their own country (Ninth Freedom right). Furthermore, cross-
border majority ownership was introduced, paving the way for member states carriers to buy or set 
up and run an airline in any EU country (Doganis, 2001).  
Such new legal frame led inevitably to the privatization of some national carriers and the 
restructuring of their business model. Traditional airlines intensified the adoption of the hub-and-
spoke-system, which, as a consequence of several mergers and acquisitions and the stipulation of 
alliances, has become in many cases a multi-hub-and-spoke system.2 The old regulated airfares 
were replaced by sophisticated yield (also known as revenue) management techniques, whereby 
carriers improved their ability of managing seats availability and differentiating the product in order 
to segment the demand and optimize their revenue management. Traditional national airlines have 
so become known as Full Service Network Carriers or simply Full Service Carriers (FSC, hereafter) 
in virtue of the several “frills” attached to the different tickets.3
                                                     
1 In this paper we define routes as airport-pairs. 
2 Hub and spoke system is a system of air transportation in which local airports offer air 
transportation to a central airport where long-distance flights are available. 
3 Examples are free on-board catering and newspapers, VIP waiting lounges, late boarding, fast 
check-in, and in-flight entertainment. 
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Another major effect of the deregulation within the European civil aviation industry has 
been the emergence of a new class of companies, known as low-cost carriers (LCC, hereafter).4 
Such companies are characterized by a very simple organization and modus operandi, which 
provide them with a competitive cost advantage with respect to the FSC. Essential to their strategy 
is the no-frills policy and the running of point-to-point services, preferably from secondary and 
small airports, where landing tax and handling fees are cheaper, turnarounds are quicker, and 
therefore better fleet utilisation and staff productivity are achievable. The simplicity of the 
distribution mainly through the Internet is another key element, as airlines acquire the ability to 
bypass global distribution systems (GDS) fees and travel agents commissions.  
As pointed out by Alderighi et al. (2004), however, the LCC’s success cannot be fully 
explained without taking into account the structural changes on the demand side. Indeed, the 
increased mobility of goods and people accompanying the process of internationalization and 
globalization has strongly contributed to a rise in the use of air transportation by business travellers. 
Besides, both a less glamorous view of the flying experience and a shift from long stays to multiple 
and short holidays, seem to have made no-frills point-to-point short-haul flights the best suitable air 
service for many tourists (Graham, 2006). Low-cost airlines represent nowadays almost 30% of the 
European market, after just a decade of their first appearance, with expectations of a 40-50% share 
in the next future (Tretheway, 2004). 
This paper contributes to the growing literature on the determinants of price tickets in the 
airline industry. The aim is to examine the pricing behaviour of the airlines based in the UK. Thus 
we will take into account the most relevant aspects of the airlines’ price setting emerged in the 
literature on the US market, and gauge whether such stylized facts apply to the European case. Our 
empirical findings, based on primary data of more than 10 million fares, support the view of airport 
and route dominance as drivers facilitating market power and higher fares, although we do not find 
any evidence of a hub premium since we find LCC tend to set higher fares outside their main hub 
airport. We also investigate the extent to which fares differ across airlines and at different times 
before a flight’s departure.  
In the next section we present a review of the literature on fare setting. In section 3 and 4 
we present the data set and the methodology, whereas Section 5 and 6 illustrate the empirical model 
and results based on the UK aviation market between 2002 and 2005. Section 7 makes some 
concluding remarks and suggestions for future research. 
                                                     
4 Undoubtedly, the heart of the LCC’s business model is represented by low costs rather than low 
fares. However, Piga and Filippi (2002) argue that since their inception, LCC have also pursued a product 
diffentiation strategy hinging around a careful choice of their departure and arrival airports. See Gil-Molto 
and Piga (2005) for an analysis of the entry and exit activity by LCC and FSC. 
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2. Fare setting in theory and practice 
A - The role of yield management 
Setting airfares and allocating aircraft seats is a complex process. Airlines have to deal with 
demand fluctuations, consumer heterogeneity, and the uncertainty about when and where 
passengers want to travel. In addition, aircraft capacity is limited and the nature of the product 
perishable, as unsold seats cannot be offered once the flight has departed (Alderighi et al., 2004).  
To deal with these challenges, airlines have developed over the years a set of techniques 
known as yield or revenue management (Weatherford and Bodily, 1992). Alderighi et al. (2004) 
distinguish between traditional and simplified yield management. The former is the one developed 
and implemented over the years by the FSC to cope with the new competitive environment that 
followed the liberalization process. The latter defines the set of techniques implemented by the 
LCC. In both cases, a central issue is the need to define and price certain product characteristics in 
order to accommodate passengers’ heterogeneity and different willingness to pay. 
Traditional companies, aware of travellers’ different preferences, have tried to meet such 
heterogeneity by offering a differentiated product with a large variety of in-flight and ground 
services. Different airfares based on the different levels of service quality are therefore offered for 
the same flight. In addition, to ensure that each segment of travellers acquires its required level of 
service, companies apply “fences” such as minimum stays at the travel destination, penalties for 
ticket cancellation or travel date change, or purchase time limits. 5
FSC offer such differentiated products through reservation classes that reflect the market 
segmentation. To each fare class a certain number of seats must be allocated in order to optimally 
accommodate the total demand. This crucial forecasting activity is known as inventory control, and 
it is applied to all flights operated by each airline in its own network.6  
In particular, purchase time limit is a “fence” that has gained more and more importance 
within the yield management. The conventional wisdom holds that carriers tend to attach 
monotonically increasing airfares to sequential booking classes in order to cope with the uncertainty 
over demand (Dana, 2001). McGill and Van Ryzin (1999) refer to the latter practice as “low-before-
                                                     
5 Fences are defined as “rules that regulate the ticketing purchase and the conditions imposed on each 
traveller category” (Alderighi et al., 2004: p 5). 
6 The inventory control is implemented by means of sophisticated computer reservation systems 
(CRS) and global distribution systems (GDS). CRS and GDS have been used in the past to present biased 
information to both travel agents and consumers (Borenstein, 1989). By doing that the airlines that own such 
devices aimed at gaining pricing power over their competitors. Nowadays, however, thanks to ad hoc 
legislation, several mergers, alliances and code-sharing agreements, and the use of the Internet as a sale tool, 
such practises seem to have lost relevance. 
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high fares” and explain that it is due to the assumption that booking requests arrive in strict fare 
sequence, from the lowest to the highest as the date of departure nears.  
Many scholars have devoted their attention to the existence of such airfare dynamics both 
from a theoretical (Belobaba, 1987; Gale and Holmes, 1992 and 1993; Dana, 1998) and an 
empirical point of view (Borenstein and Rose, 1994; Hayes and Ross, 1998; Stavins, 2001; Giaume 
and Guillou, 2004; Pels and Rietfeld, 2004; Piga and Bachis, 2007; Pitfield, 2005; Biloktach, 2006).  
Belobaba (1987), for example, explains that monotonic fares respond to a situation in which 
transaction costs of adjusting prices to the incoming information about the actual demand are high 
for FSC, especially in the context of complex hub-and-spoke systems. Gale and Holmes (1993) 
argue that in a monopoly with capacity constraints and perfectly predictable demand, advance-
purchase discounts (ADP, hereafter) are used to divert demand from peak periods to off-peak 
periods in order to maximize profits. In doing that airlines price discriminate across customers on 
the basis of their price elasticity and time valuation. Similarly, when the demand is uncertain APD 
help to improve profitability by spreading customers evenly across flights before the peak period is 
known (Gale and Holmes, 1992). Finally, Dana (1998) maintains that in competitive markets where 
prices are set before the demand is known firms find convenient to implement the “low-before-
high-fares” principle in order to cope with uncertain consumer demand.  
Stavins (2001) was the first to develop a model in which purchase restrictions and time of 
booking prior to departure were used as explanatory variables. Although the main objective of her 
study was to identify the relationship between price dispersion and concentration, her estimates also 
confirmed the idea that such ticket restrictions as the 14 days requirement, exert a negative and 
significant effect on fares. Giaume and Guillou (2004 and 2006) applied the same model to flights 
leaving from Nice (France) to several European destinations, finding further support for the 
monotonic property. More recently, Escobari (2006) has complemented Stavin’s model with the 
load factors at the moment of ticket purchases concluding that airfares’ monotonic increases over 
time are due to peak load pricing rather than inter-temporal discrimination.  
What emerges from the past contributions is the ubiquity of monotonically increasing fares 
that is assumed to hold even in the simplified yield management developed by the LCC, with fares 
becoming more and more expensive over time. Such a received wisdom is challenged in Piga and 
Bachis (2007), who present evidence indicating that for some airlines the early booking fares may 
be higher than those available from four to two weeks prior to departure. It would therefore seem 
that the monotonic property does not adequately and fully describe the time profile of many LCCs’ 
pricing schemes when on-line daily fares are used for the analysis.  
This is probably related to the easiness with which fares can be changed online, due to low 
menu costs (Smith et al., 1999). Digital markets possess characteristics that do not appear 
compatible with a monotonic temporal increase of the offered airfares. It has been argued for 
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example that search and menu costs are very low on the Internet. Customers and competitors are 
thought to be able to easily track down companies’ prices and find the cheapest fare available 
(Bailey, 1998; Bakos, 1991 and 1997; Baye and Morgan, 2001; Baye et al. 2002a, 2002b, 2003 and 
2004; Bailys and Perloff, 2002). A strictly monotonic increase of fares over time does not seem to 
be compatible with the airline market where demand uncertainty forces the companies to adjust 
their fares according to demand and makes tacit collusion difficult to sustain. 
In this study we have gathered primary data on prices posted at regular intervals before the 
scheduled departure date. Thus we can follow the inter-temporal variations of prices for each of the 
420 company-route combinations in our dataset.  
B. The role of market structure 
The deregulation of the Civil Aviation sector implemented by the European Commission 
followed the one that took place in the USA in the late 1970s. The rationale behind the American 
deregulation process was that in a contestable market the threat of a potential entry by another 
company would be enough to prevent incumbent companies from wielding pricing power. Entry 
barriers would be indeed not existent, with free entry into airports and an almost perfect mobility of 
capital, i.e. aircrafts. The only route-related sunk costs would be represented by the costs of 
advertising, certainly negligible if compared to non route-specific costs, such as acquiring an 
aircraft. In such a competitive environment companies were expected to operate efficiently, 
incrementing travellers’ surplus (Graham et al., 1983).  
A number of studies thus aimed at verifying whether such liberalization had affected U.S. 
airlines’ ability to exercise market power (Graham et al., 1983; Bailey et al., 1985; Call and Keeler, 
1985; Morrison and Winston, 1987; Reiss and Spiller, 1989; Borenstein, 1989 and 1992; Evans and 
Kessides, 1993; Kim and Singal, 1993; Peteraf and Reed, 1994; Stavins, 2001; Fisher and 
Kamerschen, 2003). The discovery that such pricing power had not been undermined over time led 
to move the focus of the analysis on to the sources of it. Graham et al. (1983), for example, drew 
attention to the fact that customers accustomed to a certain carrier and its schedule services would 
be hesitant to switch to a new operator, at least in the short period when the new company would be 
still pretty unknown. Borenstein (1989 and 1992) suggested that since incumbent airlines would be 
able to quickly and easily adapt prices and quantities in response to a new entry, they would be 
reluctant to take any action before such event had actually occurred. Furthermore, it should have 
been predicted that the airlines would have reacted to the new legislative system by implementing 
business strategies aimed at enhancing their competitive positions: such devices as frequent flyer 
programs (FFP), travel agent commission override bonuses (TACO) or biased booking due to CRS 
controlled by certain carriers are all institutions created and exploited by companies in order to limit 
competition and acquire pricing power (Borenstein, 1989).  
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Although there is general agreement on the failure of the contestability hypothesis and the 
existence of some market power in the airline industry, there does not appear to be consensus on the 
way the latter is achieved.  
Borenstein (1989) for example developed a structural model whereby prices were regressed 
on market concentration measures both at airport and route level. Dominance at both levels result in 
higher fares for passengers, because a company leading at airport level becomes inevitably 
attractive also at route level thanks to the frequency of its services. Such attractiveness seems to 
enable dominant airlines to charge more for the same service with respect to its competitors. As for 
the sources of airport dominance itself, Borenstein (1989) argued that in addition to marketing 
devices such as FFP, TACOs and CRS, other factors should be considered. In particular, the 
incumbents’ ability to inhibit potential competitors’ capacity to obtain the necessary facilities for 
entry or expansion at a particular airport should not be underestimated.  
Evans and Kessides (1993) and Evans et al. (1993), however, opposed such results arguing 
that they were biased by the lack of control for route heterogeneity. The argument goes that 
“primary impediments to intra- and inter-route mobility within the industry are airport facilities, 
product differentiation barriers arising from FFP, route-specific irrecoverable advertising and 
promotional expenditures. Otherwise, aircraft could be easily and costlessly switched among 
alternative routes rendering them naturally contestable” (Evans and Kessides, 1993: p. 73). Evans 
and Kessides’ (1993) argument is that when inter-route heterogeneity is accounted for, dominance 
at airport level proves to be the only decisive factor for achieving market power.   
That these studies report relatively similar findings suggests that the evidence for market 
power in the U.S. airline industry is quite strong. Such conclusion, nevertheless, cannot be 
automatically extended to the European market, for which the few existing contributions seem to 
rule out the presence of market power both before and after the liberalization process.  
Captain and Sickles (1997), for instance, followed a reduced-form approach and showed 
that although price/cost mark-ups were relatively high between 1976 and 1990, they appeared to be 
determined more by high cost structures due to technically inefficient use of inputs rather than by 
the exercise of pricing power.  
Carlsson (2004) and Giaume and Guillou (2004 and 2006) followed the common structural 
approach initiated by Borenstein (1989). By using data on European routes they both implemented a 
cross-section regression model in which the price of tickets associated with different company-route 
pairs is regressed on measures of market structure such as market share and concentration. Their 
results did not support the empirical findings for the U.S. market, as concentration appeared to have 
an insignificant or negative effect on the levels of price charged by European FSC. Giaume and 
Guillou (2004 and 2006) tried to find an explanation for such finding, arguing that it might be due 
to the fact that the European airlines markets are characterized by a small number of carriers on 
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each route, and market share is the major determinant of route concentration. Non-monopolistic 
concentrated routes are indeed characterized by high inequality of market shares, which leaves the 
little carriers with the only option of competing on prices. 
The most evident limitation of these studies is represented by the fact that they do not take 
account of the LCC. Such omission is not trivial, as it is legitimate to expect a different relationship 
between price setting and concentration in an environment where many of the traditional anti-
competition devices are employed. Moreover, the papers aforementioned seem to fail from the 
methodological point of view. Evans et al. (1993) warned in fact that cross-section regressions of 
price on output tend to produce biased estimates for at least two reasons. First of all, concentration 
proves to be endogenous. Performance feeds back into structure, and this produces simultaneous 
equations bias. Second, concentration is a function of outputs and therefore endogenous and 
correlated with determinants of prices such as demand and factor prices. Since these determinants of 
price are measured with error, concentration measures are correlated with the error term.  
The way suggested by Evans et al. (1993) to tackle these issues is to combine instrumental 
variables and fixed-effects in a panel data approach, although both Carlsson (2004) and Giaume and 
Guillou’s (2004 and 2006) could only produce OLS estimates on the European market based on 
pooled data. The empirical approach in this study uses panel data techniques to shed light on the 
role played by airport and route dominance in European markets. 
3. Data Collection 
A- Collection Strategy 
Most of the empirical contributions on pricing behaviour in the U.S. Civil Aviation industry 
have been conducted relying on different cohorts of the same dataset, namely the Databank of the 
U.S.A. Department of Transportation’s Origin and Destination Survey, which is a 10 percent yearly 
random sample of all tickets that originate in the United States on U.S. carriers (Borenstein, 1989; 
Evans and Kessides, 1993; Borenstein and Rose, 1994; Hayes and Ross, 1998; Stavins, 2001). In 
these studies prices are measured as one-way fares and are computed as one-half of the reported 
fare round-trip tickets. All tickets other than one-way and round trips are excluded.  
In contrast, our analysis is based on primary data on fares and secondary data on routes 
traffic, where a route is identified in this study as an airport-pair combination. The data contain 
airfares offered by the main British LCC over a span of 37 months, from June 2002 through June 
2005. By using an “electronic spider” connected directly to their websites, we retrieved prices 
posted on 6 budget carriers’ websites. We started by collecting airfares from GoFly, Buzz, Ryanair 
and Easyjet’s websites, but over the period of analysis GoFly was acquired by Easyjet (December 
2002) and Buzz by Ryanair (March 2003). Moreover, new LCC began their operations during the 
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period under investigation. The “spider” was so upgraded in 2003 to retrieve fares also from the 
BMIbaby and MyTravelLite’s sites.  
Collection of fares for flights operated by Full Service Carriers (i.e., British Airways, Air 
Lingus, Air France, Lufthansa, KLM, Alitalia, Iberia, SAS, Tap Portugal, Air Europa, BMI British 
Midland, Czech Airlines and Swiss) started in March 2003: in this case, fares were collected only 
for flights that Full Service Carriers (FSC) operated on routes similar or identical to those where a 
LCC also flew.7 This decision was necessary to reduce the number of queries made by the spider.  
Fares from the UK for flights to and from the following Euro-adopting countries were 
obtained: Austria, Belgium, France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Netherlands, Portugal and 
Spain. The countries outside the Euro area were: Czech Republic, Norway, Sweden, Switzerland as 
well as the UK, whose domestic routes were also considered. 
In order to account for the heterogeneity of fares offered by airlines at different times prior 
to departure, every day we instructed the spider to collect the fares for departures due, respectively, 
1, 4, 7, 10, 14, 21, 28, 35, 42, 49, 56, 63 and 70 days from the date of the query. Henceforth, these 
will be referred to as “booking days”. So, for instance, if we consider London Stansted-Rome 
Ciampino as the route of interest, and assume the query for the flights operated by a given airline 
was carried out on March 1st 2004, the spider would retrieve the prices for both the London 
Stansted-Rome Ciampino and the Rome Ciampino-London Stansted routes for departures on 
2/3/04, 5/3/04, 8/3/04, 11/3/04 and so on. The return flight for both types of directional journey was 
scheduled one week after the departure. For those routes where an airline operates more than one 
flight per day, all fares for every flight were collected. Thus, for every daily flight we managed to 
obtain up to 13 prices that differ by the time interval from the day of departure. The main reason to 
do so was to satisfy the need to identify the evolution of fares - from more than two months prior to 
departure to the day before departure – which has been noted to be very variable for the case of 
LCC (Pels and Rietveld, 2004; Giaume and Guillou, 2004).The spider could have retrieved any 
number of prices, but in practice the need to reduce both the number of queries made to an airline 
server and the time of programme execution to a manageable level, led to the design above. 
Furthermore, given the site characteristics of Opodo.co.uk, it was impossible to collect Full Service 
Carriers’ fares 1 and 4 days prior to departure: it was also decided to omit collecting fares from 
these companies for flights due to depart more than 49 days after the query. Thus, for Full Service 
Carriers, up to 8 fares per daily flight are available.  
                                                     
7 The airfares of the traditional companies were collected from the website www.opodo.co.uk, which 
is owned and managed by British Airways, Air France, Alitalia, Iberia, KLM, Lufthansa, Aer Lingus, 
Austrian Airlines, Finnair and the global distribution system Amadeus. Thus, fares listed on Opodo are the 
official prices of each airline, although Opodo may not report promotional offers that each airline may offer 
on their web sites. 
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The collection of the airfares has been carried out everyday at the same time: in addition to 
airfares we collected the name of the company, the time and date of the query, the departure date, 
the scheduled departure and arrival time, the origin and destination airports and the flight 
identification code.  
Fares were collected before tax and handling fees for the case of LCC, but inclusive of them 
for the Full Service Carriers (henceforth FSC). In order to induce comparability between the two 
sources of fares, we added 10 Sterling pounds to each retrieved fare from a LCC.8 Furthermore, 
fares for LCC were one-way, while those for FSC were for a round trip and were therefore halved.  
To complement the price data with market structure characteristics, secondary data on the 
traffic for all the routes and all the airlines flying to the countries indicated above was obtained from 
the UK Civil Aviation Authority (henceforth, CAA).9 For each combination of company, route and 
departure period (i.e., month/year), the CAA provided the number of monthly seats, the number of 
monthly passengers and the monthly load factors. These were broken down at the flight 
identification code level, that is, for each flight operated by all the airlines in a given month and 
route. However, in order to create a more balanced panel, fares and traffic statistics were aggregated 
at the route level for each airline. 
B – Data analysis 
A total of more than 10 million daily fares were retrieved, but because of the need to match 
daily data on airfares with monthly traffic information the sample used for the empirical analysis 
contains about 650,000 monthly-averaged fares’ observations.  
Tables 1a and 1b report average one-way fares by airlines and booking days before 
departure for different days of the week (corresponding to the week days – Tuesday to Thursday - 
and the week-end – Friday to Monday - timetables). The vast majority of the observations are 
relative to the LCC, and in particular to Easyjet and Ryanair, which alone account for more than 
350,000 observations. The two main British FSC are also highly represented: British Airways with 
more than 30,000 observations and BMI with almost 15,000, to which one should add the 
observations of its low-cost subsidiary, BMIbaby. Recall that routes offered by the FSC were 
selected only for those markets (identified by city pairs, e.g., London to Paris) where at least a LCC 
also operated.10 The number of observations for the traditional companies is understandably 
reduced. 
****TABLES 1a and 1b approximately here **************** 
                                                     
8 £10 was in fact the average amount of taxes that customers were asked to pay across companies and 
routes over the period under investigation. 
9 See www.caa.co.uk 
10 In this paper we define city pairs as vast areas with different airports that serve the same market 
(Liu and Serfes, 2005).  
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Table 1a and 1b represent also a straightforward way to compare prices by competing 
companies in differentiated markets. Generally, airfares offered by the FSC are higher, especially 
during the week-end. The only exception seems to be GoFly, whose fares for early bookings appear 
constantly higher than those offered by most of the other airlines in our sample. Finally, it is worth 
noticing how Air Europa appears to implement a pricing policy similar to the one of the LCC, with 
very low levels of fares.  
Fares for flights due to depart over the week-ends were on average higher than for services 
scheduled during the week. This seems to hold for both LCC and FSC, even if the magnitude of 
such fare-difference varies across companies in virtue of the different cost structures.11
An interesting feature of our dataset regards, however, the fact that fares offered for late 
bookings are consistently higher than those for early bookings. As pointed out by Doganis (2001), 
flights appear to be opened with low prices, but then fares are monotonically increased until they 
reach the maximum level right before the departure.  
The average increase across companies seems to be within £30, even if important 
exceptions can be identified. In particular, Ryanair’s average fare 4 to 1 days before departure 
proves to be three times higher than the one offered 70 to 56 days before the scheduled date, for a 
total difference of around £50. Easyjet’s prices more than double their value over time, with an 
absolute change of around £40. Finally, it is noteworthy the temporal pricing behaviour of Iberia, 
whose fares tend to double in a period of time of just 40 days, and that of Aer Lingus and Air 
Europa, for which the offered airfares seem to slightly decrease over time.  
These findings are further illustrated in Figures 1 and 2, where initial support for the 
observation that an airline charges more as the day of departure nears is presented. Figure 1 depicts 
the temporal evolution of fares offered by the UK-based LCC, and it seems to confirm that also 
budget airlines monotonically increase their prices over time in line with the traditional yield 
management. In particular, it is worth noting the pricing behaviour of Ryanair, Easyjet and MTL, 
whose prices not only steadily increase as the day of departure gets closer, but they also exhibit a 
large hike in the last week.  
***FIGURES 1 AND 2 APPROXIMATELY HERE ************** 
Figure 2, in contrast, depicts the temporal fare variation of the European FSC operating 
from the UK. The general picture seems to be validated: prices move from the lowest levels seven 
weeks before the departure to the highest levels one week before the scheduled date for almost all 
carriers. Exceptions are represented once again by Aer Lingus, Air Europa and Tap Portugal, which 
present a flat if not decreasing line over time. As for Iberia, the graph backs up the idea that the 
Spanish carrier is the FSC whose fares are increased the most over time. It is important to compare 
                                                     
11 Airlines charge differently for different days of the week in order to maximize revenues. The 
rationales behind such policies are generally identified with discriminatory pricing and/or peak-load pricing. 
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the evidence in both figures with the findings in Piga and Bachis (2007), where many exceptions to 
the monotonic property of fares are shown. Since this study uses the same dataset as in Piga and 
Bachis (2007) but at a more aggregated level, we conclude that the evidence presented here 
indicates that the monotonic property holds on average, but it may prove invalid with highly 
disaggregated fares data where fare levels are driven by contingent demand situations.  
Table 2a and 2b describe the UK market by the average number of companies at origin 
airports, routes and city pairs based on the data collected from the Internet. In order to show the 
reliability of our sample, we report in brackets the corresponding values do not differ significantly 
from the population ones, suggesting a good correspondence between our sample and the market as 
a whole.  
***** TABLES 2a and 2b approximately here ********* 
A notable pattern emerging from Tables 2a and 2b pertains to the small number of airlines 
per markets. European airline markets are generally geographically small and characterized by short 
distances between major agglomerations, especially if compared to the U.S. situation (Giaume and 
Guillou, 2004). This entails that the total demand might not be sufficient to support the presence of 
many companies on the same route, also because of the presence of alternative transportation such 
as trains. Moreover, adjacent routes within the same city pair, i.e. London Heathrow-Rome 
(Ciampino) and London Stansted – Rome (Ciampino), or within a multi-city agglomeration, i.e. 
Manchester-Rome (Ciampino) and Liverpool-Rome (Ciampino), might be perceived as substitutes 
by customers, or presented as such by competing carriers, further reducing the room for the 
presence of many operators in the same market.  
Table 2a shows that the average number of companies per routes operated by the LCC is 
generally less than two, whereas at city level the number rises to more than three. These values are 
lower than the ones reported in Table 2b for the FSC, in support of the idea that budget airlines tend 
to serve smaller markets than the traditional carriers. Such finding is further corroborated by the 
average number of airlines operating at airport level: UK-based LCC seem to operate from airports 
served by an average of 10 airlines against the average 20 carriers in airports served by the FSC.  
This fact might not come as a surprise, but its consequences in terms of the relationship 
between prices and market structure might be important. By operating from and to small airports 
LCC are certainly able to avoid the direct competition of other companies, and thus acquire market 
dominance. Nevertheless, small airports tend to serve small and secondary markets, where demand 
for air services might not be as strong and continuous as in other bigger markets. Airlines might 
therefore find themselves in a position to have to create and stimulate the demand by keeping fares 
constantly low and by launching frequent offers. In such markets companies might indeed struggle 
to take advantage of their dominant positions, as filling aircrafts becomes the priority. The usual 
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assumptions on the positive relationship between fares and market dominance might not hold, as the 
capacity to acquire pricing power might be hindered by the modest demand.  
Although important, these findings are based on a partial analysis that does not take into 
account other potential factors affecting the fare-setting process. Furthermore, such an aggregate 
analysis ignores important information related to route and days of booking heterogeneity, whose 
fundamental role has already been highlighted in the literature.  
4 Methodology 
Two reduced-form models are estimated. The first is formally represented as follows: 
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 where i identifies the company, j the route, b the booking days prior to departure, and d the day of 
the week in which the flight is scheduled and t a given month. Thus Pijbdt represents the mean value 
of all the daily fares observations for each ijbd group in month t. That is, for each month, average 
fares for an airline on a given route were thus calculated by using all the fares’ observations in the 
different “booking days” and “days of the week” groups, which constitute important sources of 
heterogeneity.  
The second approach aggregates over “booking days” and therefore considers the 
determinants of the average monthly price as a result of the different fares available at different 
points in time. That is: 
ijdtijdbiitijtjtijdt ZZXXXP εδγγβββ ++++++= 2'21'13'32'21'1)ln(                    (2) 
In both models, regressors may be time variant (the Xs) and invariant (the Zs), while the 
errors are given by the sum of an unobserved effect (the δ) and an idiosyncratic component (the ε).  
Comparisons between the estimates from (1) and (2) are assumed to yield interesting 
insights into what determines the level of fares offered by airlines, and in particular on the 
importance of temporal discriminatory pricing.  
Equations (1) and (2) present several time-invariant variables, e.g., those reporting the 
booking days, which in a fixed-effects model would be not identified. At the same time the use of a 
random-effects model would not be appropriate given the potential correlation of some regressors 
with the unobserved effects. In order to obtain coefficients for those variables that do not vary over 
time, we rely on the method developed by Polacheck and Kim (1994) and further studied by Oaxaca 
and Geisler (2003). It is a two-stage Fixed-Effect (FE) estimation procedure for the consistent 
estimation of the coefficients of the time-invariant regressors. In the first stage each model is 
estimated using a panel data FE estimator to obtain the , where k=1...3. Then, such estimates 
are used to run the following heteroschedastic-robust OLS: 
FE
kβ
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where ln(Pijbd•) and Xk• are the group means of the time variant dependent and independent 
variables and the FEkβ  are the estimated coefficients from the equations (1) and (2), k=1..3.  
Given the potential endogeneity of some of the time variant and invariant regressors, both 
first and second stage are based on an Instrumental Variable (IV) procedure.12 Furthermore, the first 
stage FE estimates are obtained using a heteroschedastic and panel autocorrelation-consistent 
variance estimator.  
5 The empirical model 
In this section, we first describe the variables used to estimate equations (1) and (2). In line 
with the literature, we estimate a pricing equation as a function of market demand characteristics, 
costs, discriminatory and peak-load pricing. 
Market characteristics 
Market structure is commonly seen as an important determinant of ticket prices, and so is 
market density. Thus, we control for the effect of market concentration and market dominance at 
airport, route and at city pairs level. Market dominance is generally measured as a company’s share 
of scheduled flights or as its share of transported passengers, whereas market concentration is 
commonly measured through the Herfindhal index (HHI) of the same variables. Herer we employ 
the number of flights, in line with Borenstein (1989), Stavins (2001) and Giaume and Guillou 
(2004). We believe in fact that, since we are dealing with fares offered on-line and not with actual 
purchased tickets, the number of flights scheduled by airlines might be a better variable to use to 
reduce a possible endogeneity bias. Indeed, the number of flights is determined well in advance 
(normally in the preceding semester) and is therefore more dependent on the forecast of future 
demand rather than on the actual demand of seats. 13 The number of travelled passengers is a less 
suitable variable as it is recorded after tickets have been sold, and is thus more closely related to the 
levels of price.  
We use the following variables for market concentration: ORIGIN_HERF - the HHI at the 
origin airport, ROUTE_HERF - the HHI at route level, and CITY_HERF - the HHI at city pairs 
level. As for market dominance, we define ORIGIN_SHR as the market share of each company at 
the origin airport, ROUTE_SHR as the share at route level, and CITY_SHR as the share at city pairs 
                                                     
12 Oaxaca and Geisler (2003) demonstrate the equivalence between the two-stage FE GLS estimates 
and the OLS coefficient estimates from a pooled cross-section, time-series model. However, since the 
estimated standard errors differ, they derive a test to discriminate between the two methods. In this paper, 
because of the potential endogeneity of some explanatory variables with the unobserved effects, we employ 
only the two-stage FE estimator. 
13 We are obviously aware of the relationship between past ticket prices, realized load factors and the 
number of scheduled flights. We will explain later how to tackle such potential endogeneity. 
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level. As shown in Table 3, a very high correlation characterises each pair of dominance and 
concentration variables. In order to tackle such multi-collinearity problem we use the market 
concentration and dominance variables separately.  
***** TABLE 3 approximately here ********* 
Increases in both ORIGIN_SHR and ORIGIN_HERF are assumed to lead to greater market 
power and previous findings suggest they are linked to greater pricing power. The evidence on 
ROUTE_SHR and ROUTE_HERF is more mixed. Borenstein (1989) initially found a positive and 
significant relationship between route market power and price tickets within the American market, 
but then Evans and Kessides (1993) and Evans et al. (1994) argued that such result was biased by 
the lack of control for inter-route heterogeneity. More recently, Stavins (2001), Fischer and 
Kamerschen (2003) and Escobari (2006) have offered new evidence on the American market, 
indicating a positive and significant role played by route dominance, but a negative and sometimes 
insignificant role played by concentration. In line with these papers, Giaume and Guillou (2004 and 
2006) found empirical evidence of a negative relationship between concentration and prices also for 
a subset of European markets.14 The inequality in the market shares controlled by each airline 
within routes has been indicated in all these studies as the decisive determinant of carriers’ pricing 
behaviour. 
While ROUTE_SHR, ROUTE_HERF, ORIGIN_SHR and ORIGIN_HERF have been 
previously used, the impact of CITY_SHR and CITY_HERF on ticket prices has never been tested 
before. This is important because in small markets like the European ones it does make sense in fact 
to assume that airports within the same city, i.e. Heathrow, Gatwick, City Airport, Stansted and 
Luton in London, or in neighbouring cities, i.e. Milan-Bergamo and Verona-Brescia, serve the same 
market. Distances between airports are relatively small and it is therefore legitimate to assume that 
for travellers close airports might represent good, although somewhat imperfect, substitutes. This 
implies that it is competition at the market level, and not at the route level, that may limit an 
airline’s ability to increase its fares. 
A central econometric issue related to the use of market shares and Herfindhal indexes 
(HHIs) as right-hand side variables in a price equation is their possible endogeneity (Borenstein, 
1989). One would assume in fact that a carrier’s share of flights in a market is a function of the 
price it asks for it and it is therefore correlated with the error term ε In equations (1) and (2). The 
HHI, having as a component the square of the market shares, is expected to be also endogenous.  
In order to tackle such endogeneity issue we have created instruments for market shares and 
HHIs at all levels of aggregation. The instruments employed for the market shares replicate the ones 
                                                     
14 These results might be biased by the fact that they do not take into account market control at 
airport level, and for Stavins and Fischer and Kamerschen also by the lack of control for routes’ 
heterogeneity. 
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used by Evans and Kessides (1993): ORIGIN_SHR is instrumented through the intra-airport rank of 
the ORIGIN_SHR itself, ROUTE_SHR through the intra-route rank of ROUTE_SHR, and 
CITY_SHR through the intra-city pair rank of CITY_SHR. Ranks are calculated in a descending 
order, i.e. the largest firm on the market has a rank of one, the second of two, etc., so that the 
instrument is negatively correlated with market share and orthogonal to the idiosyncratic error ε.15  
As for the HHIs are concerned, we developed instruments similar to those introduced by 
Hausman et al. (1994) and Hausman (1996), and used by Nevo (2000) and Gayle (2004). Given the 
specific and peculiar strategies implemented by the European airlines, we can assume that both 
LCC and FSC pursue a consistent and deliberate choice of which markets to serve. In this sense, the 
various HHIs can be thought to be influenced by a common strategy component specific to each 
airline, and therefore somehow correlated across markets. Thus we can assume that the HHI in 
market j is uncorrelated with airfares offered in markets x other than j. It follows that the HHIs 
associated to each airline in different markets segmented by type of market structure, i.e. monopoly, 
duopoly or oligopoly, can be used as instruments for each other. For each observation HHIijbdt - 
relative to company i, market (i.e. airport, route or city-pair) j, booking days prior to departure b, 
and day of the week d in month t – we therefore use as instrument the average HHIs reported in all 
the other markets x≠j operated by company i in month t, after controlling for the market structure.  
In summary, this paper uses average HHIs associated to each airline in other markets to 
instrument for its HHIs in each market. 
Market density is introduced through the variable N_airports_to_destination, which 
identifies the number of UK origin airports from which a flight to a given final destination is 
operated. N_airports_to_destination is a proxy for the importance of each destination and therefore 
for the popularity of the destination, which is possibly linked with its population size. Its sign is 
supposed to be positive, as the most served airports are also the most sought-after destinations, 
where demand is strong and product-elasticity low. Airlines are expected to be able to charge higher 
fares in these markets without losing customers. 
Another variable capable of representing market structure is D_LCC_FSC, which is a 
categorical variable for the simultaneous presence of traditional and budget airlines in the same 
route. The effect of this variable is unsure. It can be negative as a consequence of an augmented 
competition brought forward by the LCC; or it can be positive if the LCC decide to charge slightly 
less than their competitors but still more than in the rest of their own network to take advantage of 
the strong and continuous demand that usually accompanies routes served by FSC. A positive sign 
of D_LCC_FSC, however, might be just a consequence of the higher fares charged by the FSC. A 
                                                     
15 Unlike Evans and Kessides we do not need to set the largest value of the rank at three for the 
different markets as most of them have already a maximum of 3 companies. More precisely, 90% of airports 
and routes and 99% of city pairs have less than 3 airlines. 
 17
comparison between the regressions for the full sample and those for the LCC-only sample might 
help to disentangle such intertwined effects.  
Costs. 
A potential determinant of airfares is represented by the cost of jet-fuel. We collected the 
Rotterdam (ARA) Kerosene-Type Jet Fuel Spot Price from the U.S. Department of Energy’s web 
site and constructed the variable ln_fuel_price.16 The relationship between changes in the price of 
air-tickets and the cost of fuel is assumed to be positive. However, two elements might concur to 
dilute such relationship. First, it is becoming a common practice among airlines to hedge fuel costs. 
By agreeing the purchase of great quantities of jet kerosene in advance, airlines manage to keep fuel 
costs constant and be less vulnerable to the unexpected fluctuation of petrol prices. Moreover, 
takeoffs and landings are highly inefficient and require up to 50% of a flight’s fuel. Long routes, on 
which the fixed cost of the takeoff and landing is spread out, are expected to be less expensive to 
operate per mile. Thus, when analysing the role played by fuel costs it is essential to control for the 
economies of scale effect, captured by the route distance. The variable ln_ROUTE_LENGTH is thus 
included.  
Both variables are expressed in natural logarithms to reflect the fact that their elasticities are 
expected to be less than one, as the cost of transporting a passenger increases less than linearly with 
the distance (Borenstein, 1989). Distance is supposed to have a positive effect on ln_FARE 
(Borenstein, 1989), as the longer the service time the higher the costs incurred to provide such 
service.  
Finally, we use the qualitative variable D_hub_LCC, which takes value 1 when the origin 
airport matches the first hub opened in the UK by one of the LCC under investigation.17 The hub 
dummy is usually employed to capture the hub dominance effect. According to Borenstein (1989), 
hubs are in fact strongholds that seem to insulate the dominant carriers from competition and allow 
them to charge higher fares to passengers who want to fly from such airports, without any 
substantial spill-over to the other carriers operating from the same airport. In light of this, one 
should expect D_hub_LCC to positively influence ln_FARE. However, we have argued above that 
one of the main characteristics of the LCC is its cost advantage with respect to the FSC. Such cost 
advantage is achieved, among other things, by means of favourable agreements with smaller 
airports, where handling and landing fees are lower, and landing and take-off operations are quicker 
because of the reduced air traffic and the presence of dedicated infrastructures.18 This fact, along 
                                                     
16 Because these were reported in USD cents per gallon, the prices were converted using the 
euro/dollar exchange rate from Datastream. 
17 These airports are: East Midlands for BMIbaby; Stansted for Ryanair; Luton for Easyjet; Stansted 
for GoFly; Stansted for Buzz, and Birmingham for MyTravelLite.  
18 There are also examples of contracts in which airports commit themselves to provide the necessary 
advertising for the launch of new routes. 
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with the higher price elasticity of demand assumed in markets served by the LCC, might lead 
budget airlines to offer lower fares.  
Time invariant dummies. 
“Booking days” effects were taken into account by allowing the following values for b in 
the ijbd groups in equations (1) and (2): 4-1, 10-7, 21-14, 35-28, 49-42, 70-56, where these numbers 
represent how many days before departure the fares were retrieved. For each of these values a 
dummy variable was constructed, the first of which is the base case. The rationale for the inclusion 
of booking days dummies lies on the need to test the validity of the monotonic property: ceteris 
paribus, coefficients should be positive and monotonically increasing with respect to the base case.  
By considering two specifications, i.e. one including the booking days dummies, the other 
without them, we aim at verifying whether failing to control for the fares’ temporal profile might 
affect the interpretation of other regressors.  
In order to control for peak-load pricing due to seasonal fluctuations, we introduce two 
seasonal dummies, the first for the months May and September (i.e. D_Mid_season), and the second 
for the months June, July, August and December (i.e. D_High_season), leaving the D_Low_season 
as the base. The dummy D_weekend is also thought to capture some peak-load pricing, as the week-
ends are generally busier than the week days. D_weekend takes value 1 when days correspond to 
Friday, Saturday, Sunday and Monday. Finally, a dummy for each airline is included.  
6 Results 
Tables 4 and 5 present the results for equations (1) – where groups are distinguished 
according to how many days before departure the fares were retrieved - and (2) – where all the fares 
collected at different points in time before a flight’s departure are aggregated - by using different 
measures of market power: market shares in Table 4 and the Herfindhal indexes in Table 5. 
Estimates are always reported for the full sample (LCC+FSC) and for the reduced one (LCC only). 
We begin the comment by looking at the estimates for the booking days’ dummies, as these impinge 
on some of the other findings associated with the other regressors. 
 
**** TABLES 4 and 5 approximately here ********* 
 
The role of the inter-temporal profile of fares. 
One of the thrusts of this paper is to evaluate the extent to which the fares posted by an 
airline at different points in time prior to a flight’s departure are responsible for fares’ dispersion. 
Dummies for the different booking days before departure seem to suggest that airfares do actually 
monotonically increase over time. Buying a ticket between 70 to 56 days before the scheduled 
departure date produces, ceteris paribus, a discount of about 72% with respect to a fare posted 
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between 4 and 1 days before the departure. Similarly, and always relative to the latter base case, 
advance-purchase discounts amount to about 56% for fares posted 35 and 28 days before the flight 
departs, and to about 30% for the “10 to 7 days” group. These findings confirm the previously 
discussed descriptive evidence that early booking fares tend to be cheaper, although this holds true 
only “on average”, given the evidence presented in Piga and Bachis (2007). The rationale behind 
these pricing strategies (that seem to hold for both LCC and FSC) is simple: committing to a steep 
inter-temporal profile enables the companies to benefit from the implementation of inter-temporal 
price discrimination, leaving open the possibility of “randomly” (at least in the eye of the potential 
customer) reducing fares to manage stochastic demand efficiently.  
The role of market structure. 
The market share that a LCC enjoys in the origin airport (ORIGIN_SHR) appears to be 
highly correlated with the fare levels: more contrasting evidence is found in the full sample, where 
no significant impact is revealed in the case of fares aggregated across all booking days. It would 
seem, therefore, that airport dominance plays a crucial role for the FSC only for the fares associated 
to a particular set of booking days, i.e., the late booking ones. Table 5 reports that the airlines 
operating in a highly concentrated origin airport (ORIGIN_HERF) can benefit from a significant 
fare premium. That is, a 10 percent increase in ORIGIN_HERF is associated with about a 4-6 
percent higher level of fares.  
In the full sample of Table 4, we show how a fifty percent increase in an airline’s market 
share in a route (this is tantamount to a comparison between a route with two identical firms and a 
monopolistic route) drives fares up by about 27 percent. The impact of ROUTE_SHR is much 
smaller in the LCC sample (about 15%) and is significant only when the fares are disaggregated at 
the booking days level, suggesting that the increase may be associated only with the late booking 
fares (see above). The latter finding is further supported by the estimates for ROUTE_HERF in 
Table 5, which are significant only when eq. (1) is estimated.  
Enjoying a large market share at the city-pair level (CITY_SHR) does not seem to enable 
the airlines to post higher fares. This may be because of the large substitutability between routes 
within a city-pair, or even between routes in bordering city-pairs. A negligible impact is found when 
we consider the concentration index (CITY_HERF) in Table 5.  
 The positive sign of N_airports_to_destination’s coefficient clearly suggests that on routes 
where demand is strong airlines can afford to offer higher fares, thanks to a low product elasticity of 
demand. It is noteworthy, though, that the effect on ticket prices is very limited, as the magnitude of 
the coefficient in both Table 4 and 5 reveals.  
In the routes where there is direct competition between a LCC and a FSC (D_LCC_FSC), 
we observe the effects vary in sign and magnitude depending on the type of sample used. Using the 
full sample, the coefficient is insignificant in Table 4 when eq. (2) is estimated, but positive and 
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significant for the case of eq. (1). Always in Table 4, but using the LCC sample, the coefficients for 
both equations become negative: we conclude that fares are generally lower in these routes, but that 
the presence of a LCC does not deter a FSC from engaging in inter-temporal price discrimination 
and increasing their late booking fares. A similar conclusion can be reached by looking at the 
estimates in Table 5, where it is shown that late booking fares by the LCC may also be higher in 
these routes, suggesting that competition intensity may wane in the periods immediately preceding a 
flight’s departure. 
The role of costs.  
In Tables 4 and 5, the logarithm of the distance in mile (ln_ROUTE_LENGTH) is as 
expected positively related to ln_FARE as shorter routes are cheaper to run (in absolute terms) than 
longer ones. The estimates show that an increase of 10 percent in the route’s length leads to an 
increase of about 4 percent in fares. However, such a relationship is hardly linear, and this may be 
the reason why we find a negative and significant coefficient for ln_fuel_price. A complementary 
explanation may be associated with the long-term contracts that airlines sign with fuel companies, 
which hedged them from the risk due to the increase in the oil prices which occurred in the second 
half of our sample period.  
The routes that the LCC operate from their hubs (D_hub_LCC) appear to be characterised 
by lower fares, especially in the case of Table 4. Following such statement, we can assume that the 
agreements signed between airports’ authorities and LCC provide the latter with a competitive 
advantage. Such advantage, however, does not result in higher fares as theorized by Borenstein 
(1989), but rather in lower fares. Hub dominance by the LCC seems to be more related to the 
acquisition of cost advantages than to pricing power. As usual, we note that early booking fares for 
hub routes may drastically differ from late booking ones.  
Other control variables 
Among the other control variables, D_season and D_weekend are meant to capture peak-
load pricing effects. Both dummies present a positive and significant coefficient, as expected. In 
particular, we show evidence in Tables 4 and 5 that fares in high season are about 8 percent higher 
than in mid season, and these are in turn 10-15 percent higher than in the low season (the base case). 
Similarly, tickets for week-end flights are on average 22-24 percent higher than those for flights 
scheduled during the week.  
Finally, the airline dummies prove to be consistently significant across models and 
specification, confirming the existence of company specific effects.19 As expected fares offered by 
the LCC are, ceteris paribus, cheaper than those posted by the FSC. For example, depending on the 
model’s specification, Ryanair’s fares are between 11 and 33 percent cheaper than those posted by 
                                                     
19 To save space, Tables 4 and 5 report only the coefficients of the LCC and of the main Full Service 
Carriers. The full set of companies’ estimates is available on request from the authors. 
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the base-case airline, BMIBaby, while Alitalia’s fares are between 40 and 50 percent higher than the 
latter. The estimates thus reflect the descriptive evidence discussed in previous sections. 
7. Summary and conclusion 
Using evidence from about 460 European company-route pairs over a period of 37 months, 
this study aimed to shed some light on two issues relating to the pricing behaviour of the main 
European airlines: 1) the extent to which an airline’s dominant position at the origin airport, at the 
route and the city-pair level affects the airlines’ market power; 2) whether fares follow a monotonic 
time path consistent with the pursuing of an inter-temporal price discrimination strategy. 
Previous studies deemed the companies’ strategic behaviour in the form of Frequent Flyer 
Programmes, incentivizing contracts to the Travel Agents and the use of Computer Reservation 
Systems as the source of an airline’ airport dominance. Interestingly, we also find a positive 
relationship between an airline’s market share at the origin airport and the fares it charges, 
especially when we limit the analysis to the sample of Low Cost Carriers. However, the latter do not 
make use of any of the above forms of strategic and marketing behaviour, suggesting that for the 
European markets a dominant position at an airport level cannot be based only on the received 
wisdom from the U.S. experience. Indeed our findings suggest that for the Low Cost Carrier 
segment, airport dominance is more likely to be a reflection of an airline’s ability to operate at 
lower costs than the result of an airline’s strategic behaviour.  
Our estimates reveal that enjoying a dominant position within a route is conducive to higher 
fares, possibly because of the limited size of many “natural monopoly” routes that facilitate the 
incumbent’s engagement in a limit pricing strategy. On the contrary, a larger share within a city-pair 
does not seem to facilitate the exercise of market power, thereby suggesting the existence of a large 
degree of substitutability between the routes in a city-pair. 
Using fares aggregated at the monthly level, we find robust support to the assumption that 
fares follow a monotonic time path. The rationale for this strategy is well known: the airlines apply 
this second-degree price discrimination scheme when they face demand from consumers with more 
certain demand, who buy at early stage, while travellers with more uncertain demand purchase later 
and are forced to pay a premium (Gale and Holmes, 1993). We also argue, however, that the 
monotonic property holds on average, but in some of our previous work - when we consider fares 
disaggregated at the daily level -, we often observed late booking fares to be cheaper than fares 
posted earlier (Piga and Bachis, 2007).  
From a policy viewpoint, our analysis reveals the dualism that characterises the European 
airlines’ sector. On the one hand, we note the Traditional Carriers’ group, which has found 
enormous difficulties in adjusting to the new post-liberalisation competitive environment. On the 
other, we find the Low-Cost Carriers segment, which consistently offers highly demanded services 
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at very competitive prices and has been extremely active in expanding its operations by creating real 
pan-European networks. In particular, the liberalisation has produced two companies, Ryan Air and 
Easyjet, that after having consolidated their positions in the U.K. markets in the early post-
liberalisation years, have expanded by creating hubs in practically every European country. They 
were also the first to enter massively in the East European countries that have recently enlarged the 
European Union, by connecting them with most other member States. Unfortunately, the dynamism 
of the U.K. market constitutes an isolated case in Europe, as no “low-frills company” equivalent in 
size to Ryan Air or Easyjet, has emerged in such countries as Germany, France, Italy or Spain. This 
may be due to the dominant position in each of these domestic markets still maintained by their 
former flag carriers. As discussed by Lee (2003), in the U.S. concentration dropped in the years 
immediately following deregulation, but then rose steadily starting in the mid 1980s reaching its 
peak in the early 1990s: this might also happen in Europe unless more effective competition is 
enabled in every national market.  
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Table 1a. Fare breakdown by company, booking day and day of the week. Only LCC. 
Days of booking before scheduled departureCompany Days of  the week 70-56 49-42 35-28 21-14 10-7 4-1
Total 
Obs. 
week days 42,41  (6923) 
45,43 
 (4060) 
49,54
 (4156)
52,46
 (4282)
56,67
 (4346)
62,86
(4097) 27864 
Bmibaby 
week-end 52,15  (8849) 
55,23 
 (5110) 
59,25
 (5171)
63,11
 (5338)
67,00
 (5484)
71,02
 (5114) 35066 
week days 25,85  (23948) 
26,88 
 (14534) 
28,96
 (14884)
34,58
 (15200)
46,99
 (15448)
77,83
 (15242) 99256 
Ryanair 
week-end 36,90  (32020) 
37,98 
 (19430) 
39,96
 (19841)
46,76
 (20247)
59,48
 (20604)
93,65
 (20313) 132455 
week days 39,20  (25124) 
44,96 
 (15111) 
49,29
 (15420)
49,63
 (15792)
55,78
 (16129)
80,23
 (16055) 103631 
Easyjet 
week-end 49,07  (32114) 
56,26 
 (19131) 
61,76
 (19417)
62,06
 (19921)
66,49
 (20301)
88,60
 (20161) 131045 
week days 47,15  (822) 
50,06 
 (704) 
52,71
 (758)
59,00
 (828)
63,25
 (771)
70,55
 (762) 4645 
Buzz 
week-end 54,25  (1063) 
60,48 
 (909) 
64,05
 (977)
72,02
 (1060)
75,72
 (987)
80,15
 (971) 5967 
week days 57,14  (960) 
61,67 
 (748) 
63,54
 (796)
70,97
 (922)
75,40
 (871)
84,79
 (855) 5152 
GoFly 
week-end 69,33  (1277) 
74,19 
 (996) 
77,24
 (1059)
83,88
 (1227)
87,50
 (1160)
90,06
 (1138) 6857 
week days 50,23  (1176) 
49,91 
 (757) 
50,59
 (776)
52,22
 (798)
55,38
 (830)
83,16
 (843) 5180 
MTL 
week-end 55,76 (1829) 
54,49 
 (1151) 
55,30
 (1184)
57,00
 (1230)
59,48
 (1284)
85,73
 (1272) 7950 
Total 
Obs. LCC  136105 82641 84439 86845 88215 86823 565068 
Note: number of observations in parenthesis. Source: Fares retrieved from the airlines’ web sites. 
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Table 1b. Fare breakdown by company, booking day and day of the week. Only FSC. 
Days of booking before scheduled departure
Company Days of the week 49-42 35-28 21-14 10-7 TotalObs.
week days 77,55  (720) 
75,25
 (734)
74,61
 (768)
72,93
 (744) 2966Air Lingus 
week-end 83,37  (935) 
82,66
 (923)
84,83
 (961)
86,68
 (935) 3754
week days 47,67 (63) 
50,05
 (67)
49,45
 (73)
50,09
 (78) 281Air Europa 
week-end 58,93  (101) 
61,89
 (100)
61,82
[(114)
64,45
 (112) 427
week days 39,98  (139) 
42,00
 (139)
46,97
 (150)
55,78
 (146)
574
Air France 
week-end 42,69  (184) 
45,28
 (178)
50,94
 (195)
57,32
 (193) 750
week days 66,61  (428) 
68,65
 (439)
76,92
 (464)
89,23
 (456) 1787Alitalia 
week-end 72,38  (561) 
77,69
 (574)
86,44
 (591)
98,05
 (592) 2318
week days 46,76 (1512) 
49,32
 (1520)
56,69
 (1629)
71,15
 (1599) 6260BMI 
week-end 51,57  (2000) 
54,50
 (1955)
62,28
 (2100)
74,16
 (2082) 8137
week days 59,12  (3637) 
61,70
 (3610)
70,86
 (3876)
92,32
 (3783) 14906British Airways 
week-end 67,07  (4815) 
71,28
 (4666)
80,42
 (4996)
98,26
 (4957) 19434
week days 64,14  (139) 
67,19
 (138)
71,80
 (144)
78,43
 (142) 563Czech Airlines 
week-end 79,95  (182) 
83,70
 (172)
88,72
(186)
96,06
 (184) 724
week days 65,27  (461) 
70,05
 (468)
80,43
 (498)
102,14
 (499) 1926Iberia 
week-end 80,31  (610) 
87,89
 (601)
98,67
 (647)
119,64
 (640) 2498
week days 83,54  (275) 
84,32
 (275)
87,56
 (292)
92,87
 (288) 1130KLM 
week-end 67,57  (360) 
69,90
 (351)
75,20
(376)
80,93
 (370) 1457
week days 60,28  (461) 
61,34
 (465)
64,73
 (499)
73,87
 (493) 1918Lufthansa 
week-end 58,30  (610) 
59,48
 (596)
63,73
 (648)
71,64
 (641) 2495
week days 66,78  (402) 
68,57
 (404)
73,97
 (433)
79,40
 (420) 1659SAS 
week-end 70,77  (536) 
73,01
 (516)
79,16
 (555)
86,93
 (550) 2157
week days 67,94  (430) 
71,05
 (431)
79,43
 (464)
95,08
 (453) 1778Swiss 
week-end 75,20  (573) 
78,96
 (556)
87,21
 (596)
100,97
 (577) 2302
Total Obs FSC 20228 19985 21366 21046 82625
Note: number of observations in parenthesis. Source: Fares retrieved from the airlines’ web sites. 
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Table 2a. Number of companies by origin airports, routes and city pairs. Low-Cost Carriers. 
Company Variable Mean Standard Deviation Min Max Obs 
companies per airport 11 (9.9) 10.6 (9.3) 2 (2) 35 (36)  
companies per route 1.4 (1.4) 0.6 (0.6) 1 (1) 4 (4)  BMIbaby 
companies per city pair 3 (3.1) 1 (1.0) 1 (1) 7 (8)  
62930 
companies per airport 8.4 (8.8) 4 (4.5) 1 (1) 36 (36)  
companies per route 1.1 (1.2) 0.4 (0.5) 1 (1) 3 (3)  Ryanair 
companies per city pair 2.5 (3.1) 1.5 (1.6) 1 (1) 9 (9)  
231711 
companies per airport 11.2 (9.7) 7.1 (5.9) 2 (2) 28 (26)  
companies per route 1.4 (1.3) 0.6 (0.5) 1 (1) 5 (5)  Easyjet 
companies per city pair 3.5 (3.9) 1.5 (1.5) 1 (1) 8 (8)  
234676 
companies per airport 9.3 (9.1) 1.5 (4.1) 7 (1) 11 (23)  
companies per route 1 (1.2) 0.2 (0.4) 1 (1) 2 (3)  Buzz 
companies per city pair 3.4 (3.5) 2.1 (2.3) 1 (1) 8 (8)  
10612 
companies per airport 8.4 (8.1) 2.1 (2.0) 3 (3) 11 (15)  
companies per route 1.4 (1.4) 0.6 (0.5) 1 (1) 3 (3)  GoFly 
companies per city pair 3.8 (4.0) 1.6 (1.6) 1 (1) 7 (7)  
12009 
companies per airport 16.1 (14.0) 2.2 (3.3) 14 (3) 28 (28)  
companies per route 1.6 (1.5) 0.8 (0.8) 1 (1) 4 (4)  MTL 
companies per city pair 3.7 (3.4) 1.4 (1.2) 1 (1) 7 (8)  
13130 
Total Obs. LCC  565068 
Source: author’s calculations based on the fares retrieved from the Internet and traffic data obtained from the Civil Aviation 
Authority. The latter corresponds to the universe of UK airports, whose values are reported in parentheses. 
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Table 2b. Number of companies by origin airports, routes and city pairs. Full-Service Carriers. 
Company Variable Mean StandardDeviation Min Max Obs.
companies per airport 19.5 (18.3) 5.4 (5.6) 11 (8) 36 (36)
companies per route 2 (1.9) 0.7 (0.7) 1 (1) 3 (3)Aer Lingus 
companies per city pair 3.2 (3.3) 1 (1.1) 2 (1) 5 (5)
6720
companies per airport 23.2 (20.5) 1.2 (1.7) 20 (17) 25 (23)
companies per route 4 (3.6) 0 (0.5) 4 (3) 4 (4)Air Europa 
companies per city pair 6 (5.9) 0 (0.3) 6 (5) 6 (6)
708
companies per airport 20.7 (16.7) 1 (6.9) 19 (4) 22 (36)
companies per route 3.6 (2.2) 0.6 (1.1) 3 (1) 5 (5)Air France 
companies per city pair 5.6 (4.1) 0.6 (2.0) 5 (1) 7 (8)
1324
companies per airport 20.9 (20.6) 1.2 (3.2) 19 (15) 25 (36)
companies per route 2.6 (2.6) 0.5 (0.6) 2 (2) 4 (4)Alitalia 
companies per city pair 5 (4.9) 0.1 (0.8) 5 (2) 6 (6)
4105
companies per airport 20.7 (17.6) 0.8 (7.2) 19 (2) 22 (36)
companies per route 2.4 (2.0) 0.9 (1.0) 1 (1) 5 (5)BMI 
companies per city pair 5.3 (3.8) 0.9 (2.0) 3 (1) 9 (9)
14397
companies per airport 21.8 (18.9) 3.2 (6.8) 9 (1) 36 (36)
companies per route 2.1 (1.9) 0.7 (0.8) 1 (1) 4 (5)British Airways 
companies per city pair 4.3 (3.5) 1.1 (1.7) 3 (1) 9 (9)
34340
companies per airport 20.7 (18.1) 1 (7.1) 19 (7) 22 (36)
companies per route 2 (1.8) 0 (0.7) 2 (1) 2 (5)Czech Airlines 
companies per city pair 3.7 (2.9) 0.7 (1.1) 3 (1) 5 (5)
1287
companies per airport 20.6 (20.4) 1 (2.2) 19 (17) 22 (33)
companies per route 2.2 (2.1) 0.6 (0.8) 1 (1) 3 (4)Iberia 
companies per city pair 4.4 (4.1) 1 (1.7) 2 (1) 6 (7)
4424
companies per airport 16 (13.1) 4.9 (8.0) 9 (1) 22 (36)
companies per route 2 (1.7) 1 (0.8) 1 (1) 4 (4)KLM 
companies per city pair 6.1 (3.2) 0.4 (2.1) 6 (1) 8 (9)
2587
companies per airport 20.6 (18.4) 1 (6.2) 19 (5) 22 (36)
companies per route 2 (1.8) 0.1 (0.6) 2 (1) 3 (4)Lufthansa 
companies per city pair 3.8 (3.1) 1.1 (1.4) 3 (1) 6 (6)
4413
companies per airport 20.7 (20.8) 1 (3.9) 19 (1) 22 (36)
companies per route 1.7 (1.7) 0.4 (0.4) 1 (1) 2 (3)SAS 
companies per city pair 2.8 (2.7) 0.7 (0.8) 2 (1) 4 (4)
3816
companies per airport 16.2 (16.6) 5.1 (6.9) 9 (3) 22 (36)
companies per route 1.9 (1.6) 0.8 (0.8) 1 (1) 3 (3)Swiss 
companies per city pair 3.7 (3.3) 0.6 (1.1) 3 (1) 5 (5)
4080
companies per airport 20.7 (20.4) 0.7 (1.4) 20 (17) 22 (23)
companies per route 1 (1.6) 0 (0.5) 1 (1) 1 (3)Tap Portugal 
companies per city pair 4 (2.4) 0 (0.7) 4 (2) 4 (5)
424
Total Obs. FSC   82625
Source: author’s calculations based on the fares retrieved from the Internet and traffic data obtained from the Civil Aviation 
Authority. The latter corresponds to the universe of UK airports, whose values are reported in parentheses. 
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Table 3. Correlation among market concentration and market dominance measures. 
 ORGSHARE ORGHERF RUTSHARE RUTHERF CITYSHARE CITYHERF 
ORGSHARE 1 - - - - - 
ORGHERF 0.7215 1 - - - - 
RUTSHARE 0.4798 0.4006 1 - - - 
RUTHERF 0.4741 0.3809 0.9494 1 - - 
CITYSHARE 0.1796 0.0306 0.3414 0.3122 1 - 
CITYHERF 0.2115 0.0363 0.3361 0.3755 0.8916 1 
Source: our calculations on both the fares and Civil Aviation Authority datasets. 
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Table 4. Panel Estimates for market shares on ln_FARE. D_ identifies a Dummy variable. t-statistics in 
round brackets. 
Dependent variable: 
ln_FARE Full Sample (LCC+FSC) Only LCC 
INDEPENDENT VARIABLES 2 STAGE FE Eq. (2) 
2 STAGE FE 
Eq. (1) 
2 STAGE FE 
Eq. (2) 
2 STAGE FE 
Eq. (1) 
ln_fuel_cost -0.101*** (0.010) 
-0.003 
(0.000) 
-0.178*** 
(0.009) 
-0.039*** 
(0.00) 
ln_ ROUTE_LENGTH 0.426*** (0.000) 
0.403*** 
(0.000) 
0.385*** 
(0.006) 
0.388*** 
(0.00) 
D_hub_LCC -0.044*** (0.010) 
-0.091*** 
(0.000) 
-0.426*** 
(0.008) 
-0.106*** 
(0.00) 
ORIGIN_SHR -0.100 (0.300) 
0.272*** 
(0.020) 
1.298*** 
(0.252) 
0.356*** 
(0.02) 
ROUTE_SHR 0.546*** (0.080) 
0.412*** 
(0.010) 
0.072 
(0.075) 
0.291*** 
(0.01) 
CITY_SHR -0.489*** (0.090) 
-0.194*** 
(0.020) 
-0.439*** 
(0.086) 
-0.057** 
(0.02) 
N_airports_to_destination 0.004*** (0.000) 
0.001*** 
(0.000) 
0.005*** 
(0.001) 
0.001*** 
(0.00) 
D_LCC_FSC 0.021 (0.020) 
0.026*** 
(0.000) 
-0.118*** 
(0.019) 
-0.018*** 
(0.00) 
D_Mid_season 0.105*** (0.000) 
0.133*** 
(0.000) 
0.133*** 
(0.005) 
0.147*** 
(0.00) 
D_High_season 0.182*** (0.000) 
0.201*** 
(0.000) 
0.220*** 
(0.004) 
0.216*** 
(0.00) 
D_weekend† 0.224*** (0.000) 
0.230*** 
(0.000) 
0.246*** 
(0.005) 
0.246*** 
(0.00) 
D_RYANAIR† -0.109*** (0.010) 
-0.295*** 
(0.010) 
-0.125*** 
(0.009) 
-0.319*** 
(0.01) 
D_EASYJET† -0.032*** (0.010) 
-0.070*** 
(0.000) 
-0.057*** 
(0.007) 
-0.074*** 
(0.00) 
D_BUZZ† 0.255*** (0.010) 
0.359*** 
(0.010) 
0.879*** 
(0.013) 
0.372*** 
(0.01) 
D_GOFLY† 0.165*** (0.010) 
0.193*** 
(0.010) 
0.490*** 
(0.013) 
0.190*** 
(0.01) 
D_MTL† -0.079*** (0.010) 
0.034*** 
(0.010) 
0.588*** 
(0.013) 
0.063*** 
(0.01) 
D_AIR_LINGUS† 0.663*** (0.030) 
0.797*** 
(0.020) - - 
D_AIR_FRANCE† 0.449*** (0.020) 
0.519*** 
(0.010) - - 
D_ALITALIA† 0.394*** (0.020) 
0.502*** 
(0.010 - - 
D_BMI 0.337*** (0.010) 
0.408*** 
(0.010) - - 
D_BRITISH_AIRWAYS† 0.473*** (0.010) 
0.383*** 
(0.010) - - 
D_IBERIA† 0.325*** (0.010) 
0.461*** 
(0.010) - - 
D_KLM† 0.659*** (0.040) 
0.803*** 
(0.040) - - 
D_LUFTHANSA† 0.463*** (0.020) 
0.513*** 
(0.010) - - 
D_10-7_days_before_departure† - -0.312*** (0.010) - 
-0.314*** 
(0.01) 
D_21-14_days_before_departure† - -0.472*** (0.010) - 
-0.473*** 
(0.01) 
D_35-28_days_before_departure† - -0.557*** (0.010) - 
-0.553*** 
(0.01) 
D_49_42_days_before_departure† - -0.626*** (0.010) - 
-0.625*** 
(0.01) 
D_70_56_days_before_departure† - -0.717*** (0.010) - 
-0.714*** 
(0.01) 
Constant  - - - - 
N 46253 646826 35170 564284 
N second stage 25551 37549 21814 33399 
R2 0.1058 0.0852 0.0380 0.0955 
R2 second stage 0.4819 0.7351 0.4817 0.6509 
‡ groups defined by company, route  and days of the week. ٭groups defined by company, route, days from departure and days of the 
week. Standard Errors in the the FE models are robust to heteroschedasticity and auto-correlation.  
†Based on Oaxaca and Geisler (2003) and Polacheck and Kim (1994), the estimates from these time invariant dummies in the FE 
models are obtained from a second stage OLS estimation with White standard errors clustered over routes.  
Note: *** significant at 1%, ** significant at 5%, * significant at 10%. Only the estimates of the most important Full Service Carrier 
are reported. The full set of estimates available from the authors on request. 
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Table 5. Panel Estimates for market concentration on ln_FARE. D_ identifies a Dummy variable. t-
statistics in round brackets. 
Dependent variable: 
ln_FARE Full Sample Only LCC 
INDEPENDENT VARIABLES 2 STAGE FE Eq. (2) 
2 STAGE FE 
Eq. (1) 
2 STAGE FE 
Eq. (2) 
2 STAGE FE 
Eq. (1) 
ln_fuel_cost -0.068*** (0.010) 
0.032*** 
(0.003) 
-0.159*** 
(0.012) 
-0.010** 
(0.000) 
ln_ ROUTE_LENGTH 0.407*** (0.003) 
0.400*** 
(0.003) 
0.400*** 
(0.004) 
0.400*** 
(0.003) 
D_hub_LCC -0.024*** (0.005) 
-0.008* 
(0.004) 
-0.023*** 
(0.005) 
-0.009* 
(0.004) 
ORIGIN_HERF 0.596*** (0.140) 
0.557*** 
(0.034) 
0.395** 
(0.135) 
0.480*** 
(0.034) 
ROUTE_HERF 0.010 (0.029) 
0.118*** 
(0.006) 
-0.034 
(0.032) 
0.123*** 
(0.007) 
CITY_HERF 0.013 (0.032) 
-0.024** 
(0.007) 
0.002 
(0.032) 
-0.032*** 
(0.008) 
N_airports_to_destination 0.008*** (0.000) 
0.002*** 
(0.000) 
0.006*** 
(0.001) 
0.002*** 
(0.001) 
D_LCC_FSC 0.028 (0.017) 
0.068*** 
(0.004) 
-0.032 
(0.016) 
0.031*** 
(0.005) 
D_Mid_season 0.100*** (0.004) 
0.130*** 
(0.000) 
0.135*** 
(0.004) 
0.143*** 
(0.001) 
D_High_season 0.182*** (0.003) 
0.200*** 
(0.000) 
0.215*** 
(0.003) 
0.214*** 
(0.009) 
D_weekend† 0.223*** (0.003) 
0.230*** 
(0.003) 
0.246*** 
(0.004) 
0.246*** 
(0.003) 
D_RYANAIR† -0.204*** (0.006) 
-0.333*** 
(0.005) 
-0.183*** 
(0.006) 
-0.320*** 
(0.005) 
D_EASYJET† -0.049*** (0.006) 
-0.077*** 
(0.004) 
-0.036*** 
(0.006) 
-0.071*** 
(0.004) 
D_BUZZ† 0.368*** (0.010) 
0.312*** 
(0.007) 
0.332*** 
(0.010) 
0.300*** 
(0.007) 
D_GOFLY† 0.230*** (0.012) 
0.138*** 
(0.006) 
0.193*** 
(0.013) 
0.126*** 
(0.006) 
D_MTL† 0.046*** (0.011) 
0.014 
(0.008) 
0.005 
(0.012) 
0.000 
(0.009) 
D_AIR_LINGUS† 0.653*** (0.027) 
0.739*** 
(0.020) - - 
D_AIR_FRANCE† 0.340*** (0.022) 
0.418*** 
(0.013) - - 
D_ALITALIA† 0.405*** (0.016) 
0.407*** 
(0.014) - - 
D_BMI 0.355*** (0.010) 
0.390*** 
(0.008) - - 
D_BRITISH_AIRWAYS† 0.434*** (0.007) 
0.422*** 
(0.006) - - 
D_IBERIA† 0.400*** (0.012) 
0.424*** 
(0.009) - - 
D_KLM† 0.723*** (0.050) 
0.800*** 
(0.044) - - 
D_LUFTHANSA† 0.436*** (0.014) 
0.443*** 
(0.012) - - 
D_10-7_days_before_departure† - -0.311*** (0.006) - 
-0.313*** 
(0.006) 
D_21-14_days_before_departure† - -0.472*** (0.006) - 
-0.473*** 
(0.006) 
D_35-28_days_before_departure† - -0.556*** (0.006) - 
-0.553*** 
(0.006) 
D_49_42_days_before_departure† - -0.624*** (0.006) - 
-0.625*** 
(0.006) 
D_70_56_days_before_departure† - -0.716*** (0.006) - 
-0.714*** 
(0.006) 
Constant  - - - - 
N 46253 646826 35170 564284 
N second stage 25551 37549 21814 33399 
R2 0.0801  
0.0726 
 
0.1447 
 
0.0873 
 
R2 second stage 0.5674  
0.6826 
 0.5098 0.6596 
‡ groups defined by company, route  and days of the week. ٭groups defined by company, route, days from departure and 
days of the week. Standard Errors in the the FE models are robust to heteroschedasticity and auto-correlation.  
†Based on Oaxaca and Geisler (2003) and Polacheck and Kim (1994), the estimates from these time invariant dummies in 
the FE models are obtained from a second stage OLS estimation with White standard errors clustered over routes.  
Note: *** significant at 1%, ** significant at 5%, * significant at 10%. Only the estimates of the most important Full 
Service Carrier are reported. The full set of estimates available from the authors on request. 
Figure 1. Temporal fare variation. LCC. 
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Figure 2. Temporal fare variation. FSC.  
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